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The Use of Public Opinion Polls
in Continuance and Venue Hearings
Courts are becoming increasingly receptive to the admission of the
results of public opinion polls to show community attitudes and pre-
judgments as to certain criminal cases in which continuances or changes
of venue are sought by the defendants. Mr. Sherman concludes that
polls may provide a degree of evidentiary certainty now lacking, but
he warns that polls can also be tricky unless properly conducted and
interpreted.
by Edward F. Sherman * of the Texas Bar (El Paso)
THE PROBLEM confronting an at-
torney for a defendant in a widely
publicized criminal case, such as those
involving Jimmy Hoffa, Billie Sol
Estes, Jack Ruby or some other notori-
ous figure, is usually the same. He
knows that because the case has
aroused intense community interest and
feeling, his client may not be able to
obtain a fair and impartial jury trial.
The remedy available is to attempt
to have the case tried in another com-
munity or to have it put off until the
publicity and prejudice die down.
This is accomplished by a motion to
the judge prior to the opening of the
trial for a change of venue or a con-
tinuance. 1
'Whether the trial judge will grant
the motion is governed by a loose set
of guidelines, and usually neither the
attorneys nor the judge can be certain
just what types and amounts of evi-
dence are required to prove that
enough community prejudice exists. It
is here that the public opinion poll
can be helpful. The public opinion
poll, more than any other evidence, is
capable of providing a scientific dem-
onstration of the degree of community
prejudice.
This article will review the proce-
dure governing motions for change of
venue and continuance in criminal
cases, explore the recent trend toward
the admission of public opinion polls
in such hearings and consider the fac-
tors governing the accuracy of polls.
A Word About the
Procedure Governing Motions
A motion for a change of venue or
a continuance is generally based on an
allegation that community passions
and prejudices have been raised to the
1. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
make no express provision for a motion for
continuance. Rule 21(a) provides for transfer
of a case to another district or division "if the
court is satisfied that there exists in the dis-
trict or division where prosecution is pending
so great a prejudice against the defendant
that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial
trial in that district or division".
2. Highly publicized criminal cases often in-
volve either a violent or unsavory crime, as in
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), defendant
accused of six murders; Shepherd v. Florida,
341 U_ S. 50 (1951), four Negroes accused of
rape; United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Deano,
313 F. 2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963), defendant accused
of being "mad killer" of three persons; or in-
volve a well-known person as in Beck v.
United States, 298 F. 2d 692 (9th Cir. 1962),
trial of former Teamster president for failure
to report embezzled income; Delaney v. United
States, 199 F. 2d 107 (list Cir. 1952), trial of a
director of internal revenue for theft; United
point that impartiality is impossible
for the average juror.2 The same
ground, though with different empha-
sis, is argued in support of both mo-
tions. The motion for a change of
venue attacks the place of the trial,
attempting to show that in this ha-
mediate area a jury cannot be found
which has an open mind about the de-
fendant's case.3 The motion for a con-
tinuance attacks the time of the trial,
attempting to show that the present
climate is so biased, prejudiced or
emotion-charged that an impartial
jury cannot be obtained.4
States v. Estes, Crim. No. 66283 (W. D. Tex.
1963), appeal docketed, No. 20519, 5th Cir.
1963, trial of the Texas financier for mail
fraud; United States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp. 710
(S. D. Fla. 1962), trial of Teamster president
for mail fraud.
3. See United States v. Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512
(S. D. Tex. 1955), holding that prejudice
against a local political boss was so intense
that a fair trial was impossible in that venue.
But see, United States v. Lattimore, 112 F.
Supp. 507 (D.C. 1953), holding that, despite
publicity, the defendant could receive a fair
trial in that venue, and, in view of the nation-
wide publicity given the case, there was no
indication that he could receive a fairer trial
in another venue.
4. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961),
where eight motions for continuances made
during voir dire had been denied, conviction
reversed on grounds that "with his life at
stake, it is not requiring too much that peti-
tioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed
by so huge a wave of public passion.. .".
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The Supreme Court has established
the rule that motions for changes of
venue and continuances will be denied
if the judge is satisfied that tie jurors
chosen are, in fact, capable of laying
aside any preconceived judgments and
rendering a verdict solely on the evi-
dence presented in court and the law
as given to them by the judge.5 The
trial judge's decision is given strong
weight on appeal and will not be over-
turned in the absence of a clear showing
of abuse. 6
In applying this test the decisions
have adopted the further rule that the
judge may defer ruling on the mo-
tions until the entire voir dire has
been examined.7 The burden is thus
placed on the judge to weigh the an-
swers given by the prospective jurors
called on voir dire to determine wheth-
er there is such a high degree of preju-
dice that it would be unlikely that
twelve jurors could be chosen whose
verdict would be untainted by the
dominant community prejudice.8
Finally, after listening to and evalu-
ating the answers of the venire, the
judge is permitted to receive whatever
testimony or evidence he feels would
be relevant before he must make his
decision as to whether a fair and im-
partial trial is possible. 9 It is in re-
gard to this portion of the hearing
that there is a growing demand for
techniques which are reliable indica-
tors of the community feeling and an
increasing use of the public opinion
poll.
The traditional submittals of evi-
dence at this stage of the hearing by
the defense to prove community prej-
tdice might include: (1) copies of
local newspapers prior to the trial,
Also see, United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D.
296 (S. D. N. Y. 1952), where "time" of trial
was attacked by motion for change of venue,
reversing conviction on grounds that defendant
had been on TV crime commission hearings
only days before trial and intense publicity
had continued up to the morning of the trial.
5. Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 2; Brown v.
Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953); United States v.
United States Gypears Comapany, 333 U. S. 364
(1948).
6. Addison v. United States, 217 F. 2d 808
(5th Cir. 1963): Beck v. United States, supra
note 2: Greenhill v. United States, 298 F. 2d
405 (5th Cir. 1962); Connelly v. United States,
249 F. 2d 576 (8th Cir. 1957): Mayo v. Black-
burn, 250 F. 2d 645 (5th Cir. 1957).
7. Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 2; Brown v.
Allen, supra note 2; Rizzo v. United States,
304 F. 2d 810 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Blette-nan, 279 F. 2d 320 (2d Cir. 1960);
United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 33 (S. D.
N, Y. 1956); United States ex rel. Bloeth v.
Deno, supra note 2; United States v. Kline,
with prejudicial headlines or stories or
incompetent evidence which may have
been seen by prospective jurors; 10
(2) testimony of citizens or of opinion
"experts" as to the dominant feelings
in the community concerning the de-
fendant's guilt;" (3) evidence of in-
flaimatory or prejudicial radio or
television broadcasts, speeches, public
indignation meetings, pamphlets, ser-
mons, etc.12 This evidence, at best,
is an unreliable indicator of cornmuni-
ty feelings. Inflammatory headlines
or prejudicial stories may indicate
prejudice within the community, but
the degree and extent of prejudice are
not ascertainable from them.
It is with knowledge of the unrelia-
bility of these traditional evidentiary
methods in mind that defense attor-
neys have turned to the public opinion
poll to demonstrate the extent and in-
tensity of community prejudice. The
reason generally given for permitting
the judge to accept further evidence
of community prejudice, after listen-
ing to the answers of the venire panel,
is that if he finds that substantial prej-
udice exists in the community as a
whole, then a jury panel chosen at
random from the community would be
likely to contain the same percentage
of prejudice.
The advocates of the public opinion
poll argue that an opinion poll is capa-
ble of showing as an exact percentage
the amount of prejudice harbored by
the comnmunity and is competent to
prove that a jury panel is not fair and
impartial. A venireman, when inter-
rogated by the court., may not reveal
the full extent of his prejudices, be-
cause of conscious deceit, fear or poor
questioning. However, when interro-
205 F. Supp. 637 (D. C. Minn. 1962).
8. See United States ex rel. Boeth v. Denno,
supra note 2; Blumentleld v. United States, 284
F. 2d 46 (8th Cir. 1960); Delaney v. United
States, supra note 2; United States v. Reece,
(E. D. Ida. 1922); United States v. Bonanno,
177 F. Supp. 106, (S. D. N. Y. 1959).
9. For scope of evidence admitted in sup-
port of motions, see Blumenfield v. United
States, supra note 8; United States v. Bletter-
man, supra note 7; Delaney v. United States,
supra note 2.
10. See United States v. Estes, supra note 2;
Blinnenfield v. United States, supra note 8;
United States v. Blettermnan, supra note 7, for
cases admitting files of clippings from local
newspapers in evidence; Delaney v. United
States, supra note 2, admitting exhibits of
newspaper headlines and condemnatory car-
toons.
11. See Blumenfield v. United States, supra
note 8, admitting testimony of a local radio
station manager that in his opinion the de-
fendant could not receive a fair trial in that
gated by a skilled public opinion poll
questioner, when he is not in court
and has no reason to hide his true
opinions, that same venireman may
reveal a much deeper set of preju-
dices.
The Recent Cases
of Bloeth and Estes
Two recent cases involved the sub-
mission of public opinion polls to
prove community prejudice against
the defendant. In both cases the trial
judge admitted the evidence, disre-
garding the traditional hearsay argu-
ment against their admissibility. But
each, after considering the evidence,
ruled against the motions.
In United States ex rel. Bloeth v.
Denno, 313 F. 2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963),
the defendant was clarged with three
nighttime murders within one week.
They had created a general hysteria
within the community. On the open-
ing day of the trial the defense moved
for a change of venue, submitting to
the court the results of a survey show-
ing widespread knowledge of prejudi-
cial publicity and formation of opin-
ions of guilt by a majority of the
community. The director of the poll
testified that he had been retained by
the defense to conduct a poll and had
interviewed 210 residents of Suffolk
County, New York. The answers to
four of the questions were:
YES NO
(1) Have you ever heard of
Francis Henry Bloeth
who is accused of mur-
dering three people in
Suffolk Countyl 210 0
(2) Do you think he is
guilty?' 3  203 0
(3) Do you know that he
venue: United States v. Reece, supra note 8,
upholding affidavits showing hostility and prej-
udice in that venue in the absence of counter-
affidavits.
12. See Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 2, admit-
ting transcripts of radio and television broad-
casts relating the defendant's past criminal
record and his confession to this and other
murders and of roving reporter's broadcasts of
curbstone opinions on defendant's guilt; Blu-
menfield v. United States, supra note 8, ad-
mitting flm strips and radio and television
scripts dwelling on defendant's unsavory past;
United States v. Bando, 244 F. 2d 813 (2d
Cir. 1957), admitting evidence of publicity
given attacks on defendant in federal grand
jury rackets investigtion hearings; Delaney
v. United States, supra note 2, admitting testi-
mony of publicized Congressional committee
hearings; United States v. Florio, 13 F. R. D.
296 (S. D. N. Y. 1952), admitting testimony of
televised crime commission hearings.
13. Three had no opinion, one was "not
sure" and three answered "Insane".
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has already confessed? 200 10
(4) Do you think he would
receive a fair trial in
Suffolk County? 14  76 133
The trial judge admitted the results
of the poll, but after bearing the ex-
amination of the venire panel, he
overruled the motion on the ground
that Bloeth could receive a fair trial
from the twelve jurors chosen. The
jury found him guilty of murder and
he was sentenced to be executed. On
appeal to the Second Circuit, the con-
viction was reversed on the ground
that the jury selected did not meet
the standards of impartiality required
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The court
referred particularly to the high de-
gree of community prejudice shown
by the public opinion poll and relied
on the poll's findings as a persuasive
evidentiary source.
When the much-publicized trial of
Billie Sol Estes for mail fraud began
in the first week of March, 1963, the
Second Circuit's opinion in Bloeth had
just been published. Estes's attorneys,
whose motion for continuance and
change of venue had previously been
denied, hurriedly arranged for a sur-
vey to be taken in the El Paso area
on the weekend before the opening
day of trial. The questions were pat-
terned after those used in Bloeth.
Four hundred and fifty interviews
were made in two days by nine un-
trained interviewers, and the findings
were as follows:
(1) Have you ever heard of Billie So]
who is accused of mail fraud com(
certain anhydrous ammonia tank
transactions ?
(2) Do you think he is guilty?
(3) Do you know whether or not he h;
fessed his guilt?
The trial judge, after admitting in
evidence the results of the poll and
volumes of newspaper clippings, de-
cided to postpone making his ruling
until the venire had been questioned.
Seventy-five veniremen were examined
before twelve jurors and two alternates
were chosen. Thirty-two stated that
they had no opinion as to Estes's
guilt, thirty-one stated that they had
an opinion, and twelve revealed some
conflict of interest which would keep
them from being jurymen in this case.
On the basis that a large percentage
of the panel had no opinion and that
all the jurors chosen gave assurances
that they had no opinion and would
try the case solely on the law and the
evidence, the judge denied the defense
motions. Estes was convicted on five
of the fourteen counts of the indict-
ment, and the case is now on appeal
to the Fifth Circuit.15
The Bloeth and Estes cases, though
not the first to admit public opinion
poll evidence to prove community prej-
udice, do indicate a growing accept-
ance by the judiciary of this evidence.
The trend, while enlightened, is not
without its dangers. Because a public
opinion poll carries with it an air of
authenticity which is highly persua-
sive, care should be taken to see that
the judge is provided with proof of its
reliability and evidence of the scien-
tific techniques used.
In the fifty-five years since Louis D.
Brandeis submitted a brief to the
YES NO DON'T KNOW
1 Estes
-erniug
432 21
256 49 134
Edward F. Sherman received his
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United States Supreme Court in Mul-
ler v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908),
with two pages of legal argument and
over a hundred pages of economic, so-
cial and medical data, social science
data have become an accepted source
of legal evidence. The public opinion
poll, after developing a reputation for
accuracy in determining consumer
preferences and voters' opinions in the
1920's, became one of the sources of
sociological evidence. 16 When Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), came
before the Supreme Court in 1949,
Texas, arguing in support of its segre-
gated law school system, submitted
findings from a survey by a profes-
sional research group showing that
four-fifths of the whites and three-
65 366
(4) Have you read or heard that Estes was
convicted of swindling in Tyler, Texas,
last November?
(5) Have you read or heard that the other de-
fendants in the El Paso case have pleaded
guilty?
(6) Have the Estes scandals been widely dis-
cussed in El Paso County?
(7) Do most people in El Paso think Estes is
guilty ?
14. One had no opinion.
15. United States v. Estes, svpra note 2.
278 146 28 Estes's 1962 conviction of swindling in a state
court was upheld on January 20, 1964, by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
16. See Tanenhaus, Social Science in Civil
Rights Litigation, in ASPECTS or LinEaTy, 91-114
163 255 14 (1958): Waterbury, Opinion Surveys in CivilLitigation, 17 Pun. Orm. Q. 71 (1953); Ken-
nedy, Law and the Courts, in THE POLLs ANDO
PUSLIC OPINION (1949); Sorensen and Soren-
336 54 27 sen, The Admissibility and Use of Opinion
Research Evidence, 28 N. Y. U. L. Rav. 1213
(1953); note, Public Opinion Surveys as Evi-
dence: The Pollsters Go to Court 66 HAMy. L.
288 31 122 Rav. 498 (1953).
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fifths of the Negroes in the state fa-
vored segregated universities.
The public opinion poll was ideally
suited for providing sociological evi-
dence of which an appellate court
could take judicial notice in determin-
ing the constitutionality of a statute,
but its acceptance as primary evidence
before a trial judge was more difficult
to uphold.
One of the first attempts to use a
public opinion poll as evidence in sup-
port of motions for a continuance and
a change of venue occurred in 1953 in
State v. Irvin, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla.).
Irvin and two other Negroes had been
convicted in Lake County, Florida, of
raping a sixteen-year-old white girl,
but the conviction was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court on a
technicality and the trial reset in
neighboring Marion County. Irvin's
attorneys sought a change of venue or
a continuance. The Elmo Roper Re-
search and Public Opinion Organiza-
tion was hired at a cost of more than
$7,000, paid by the N.A.A.C.P. Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, and
trained interviewers questioned more
than 1,500 adults on a quota sam-
pling basis in Lake and Marion Coun-
ties and in two more distant counties.
The survey director and the field su-
pervisor testified to the methods used
in conducting the poll and to the re-
sults showing that a much more preju-
dicial climate existed in Lake and
Marion Counties than in the more dis-
tant counties. After hearing the testi-
mony, the trial judge excluded it as
hearsay because the witnesses had not
themselves done the interviewing. The
Supreme Court of Florida sustained
the refusal to admit the evidence.
There are three theories which have
been used by courts to avoid the
hearsay stumbling block.
The expert witness theory would
permit the professional pollster who
conducted the poll to take the stand
and testify, as an expert, as to what
conclusions he can draw from the re-
sults of the poll based on the polling
techniques used. 17 This theory, how-
ever, has not fared well with the
courts. The poll director in Irvin was
permitted to testify only as to the
methods used in conducting the sur-
vey, while only the actual interview-
ers would have been permitted to
testify as to the answers given. In
Elgin National Watch Company v.
Elgin Clock Company, 26 F. 2d 376 (D.
Dela. 1928), in which a survey was
taken to determine whether the aver-
age person would confuse the names
of the two companies involved, it was
held that the director of the survey
was not giving an expert opinion, but
only testifying as to the facts of what
the interviewees said, and so he was
relating hearsay.
The second theory, the public wit-
ness theory, would permit the poll di-
rector to testify to the results of the
poll as a public witness who is merely
relating his opinion of what the com-
munity mind on the issue is. This has
been the traditional method for get-
ting evidence of community prejudice
before the judge in continuance and
venue hearings. The drawback to the
use of public witnesses is, as Lester
Waterbury has written: "The poison-
ous feature of the public witness meth-
od is, of course, that all too frequently
they are selected not impartially but
because they will testify the way the
party selecting them wants them to
testify."18 Nevertheless, courts have
been willing to admit the testimony
of public witnesses, often knowing
that they are testifying as the party
who selected them wishes, while re-
jecting public opinion polls as hear-
say.
There have been no direct holdings
that the public witness exception is
broad enough to include the results of
public opinion polls, but the readily
granted admissibility of polls in Bloeth
and Estes may indicate a growing ac-
ceptance of this theory. If the pollster
may testify as a public witness as to
what he thinks are the opinions of the
community, it does not seem to stretch
the logic too far to permit him to testi-
fy as to the results of questionnaires
answered under his direction and as
to his conclusions in interpreting the
results into mathematical percentages
applicable to the entire community.
The third theory, judicial notice,
may be the simplest way around the
hearsay problem. Since the judge in
a continuance or venue hearing is
given the widest latitude in admitting
evidence which would aid him in de-
termining whether a fair trial is pos-
sible, he should be able to take judi-
cial notice of the fact that the public
opinion poll is a recognized method of
determining community opinion and
that its results deserve some cred-
ence.
19
However, liberal judicial notice of
the results of opinion polls, while it
avoids the inconsistency of admitting
the testimony of public witnesses and
excluding more accurate poll results,
is not without its dangers. The judge
may tend to give too much credence
to the poll. The poll carries with it an
appearance of truthfulness, and the
judge is ordinarily not competent to
assess the factors and polling tech-
niques which have been used to obtain
the percentages the pollster claims is
a true reflection of community feel-
ing.
Thus the judge is placed in the diffi-
cult position of being required by law
to use his discretion, and yet of having
to decide what weight to give to evi-
dence based on mathematical formulae
and polling techniques with which he
is not familiar. If public opinion polls
are liberally admitted as evidence, the
defense, which orders and controls the
poll, should submit proof that stand-
ard and proper polling techniques
were followed, so that the court will
be able to judge the accuracy of the
results.
Factors Governing Accuracy
of Polling Technique
The accuracy of the results of a
public opinion poll is dependent on
the polling technique employed and
the safeguards for accuracy fol-
lowed. 20 Polling has in the last thirty
years become an accepted social sci-
ence technique, and experimentation
has pinpointed the factors on which
accuracy depends. Five factors most
often mentioned are:
(1) The sample must be of ade.
17. See Waterbury, op. cit. supra note 16.
18. See Waterbury, op. cit. supra note 16 at
74.
19. See Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc.
v. Pilot Radio Corporation, 189 Misc. 505 (N. Y.
1947).
20. Although a million persons were polled
by Literary Digest in 1936, faulty techniques
in failing to derive a proper cross-section re-
sulted in the prediction that Landon would
win the Presidential election by a landslide.
The small margin of error by prominent poll-
sters in the 1948 Presidential election has also
been attributed to faulty techniques.
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quate size to provide for high mathe-
matical accuracy.
(2) The questions asked must be
phrased so as to provide a true pic-
ture of the respondent's opinion.
(3) A proper cross-section of the
community must be interviewed so
that the answers are representative of
other persons within the community.
(4) Proper statistical techniques
must be used to evaluate the answers
and to derive the mathematical con-
clusions which should follow from
them.
(5) Competent interviewers capa-
ble of using judgment concerning the
truthfulness of the respondent and the
reliability of the cross-section must be
used.
Lack of attention to any of these five
factors may seriously jeopardize the
accuracy of the results obtained.
Size of the Sample. From the size
of the sample (the number of persons
interviewed) a mathematical percent-
age showing the standard error which
may be present can be obtained. Stat-
isticians working in the field of proba-
bility have derived the following for-
mula to show the standard error a poll
may contain based on the number of
persons interviewed:21
When a = the per cent of standard
error
p = the per cent of persons
interviewed who answered
the question the same way
q - .00 minus p
N the number of persons in-
terviewed
This formula will show us how many
persons must be interviewed in order
to obtain a certain desired percentage
of accuracy. For example, if 100 per-
sons are interviewed, and 50 per cent
of them answer "Yes" to the question,
and 50 per cent answer "No", then by
substituting in the formula:
a = N/50 X 50/100
o =/2500/100
G- 25
o 5
Thus, in this example, the standard
error when 100 persons are sampled
would be at least 5 per cent. We
know, then, that if only 100 persons
are questioned, the smallest error pos-
sible from the standard mathematical
error alone will be 5 per cent.22 All
of the other factors may cause addi-
tional error and decrease the accuracy
even more.
Phrasing of Questions: The
phrasing of questions asked by the in-
terviewer is a vital factor in deter-
mining the accuracy of the poll; of
course, it cannot be mathematically
determined. If a question is leading,
misleading or contains "come-on"
words to elicit a certain answer, the
accuracy of the poll may be seriously
undermined. A number of studies
have been made on the influence of
the wording of questions on the an-
swers given, and startling conclusions
have been found.23 In 1940 Hadley
Cantril asked persons the question:
Do you think the United States should
do more than it is now to help England
and France?
Later he asked the same question with
the addition of the words at the end
"in their fight against Hitler". He
found that the emotion-packed word
"Hitler" caused 9 per cent more per-
sons to reply "Yes" to the question.24
Pollsters have found that there are
any number of magic words which
carry connotations causing people to
answer the question a certain way.
"Socialism", "fascism", "dictator",
"radical" and "reactionary" are al-
most certain to color the answer given
by the interviewee. Elmo Roper in
1940 found that by changing the
question:
Do you think the U.S. should do
everything in its power to promote
world peace?
to read:
Do you think the U.S. should be-
come involved in a plan to promote
world peace?
a considerably higher percentage of
"No" answers was obtained.25 The
order in which questions are asked
21. See BLANKENSHIP, CONSUMER AND OPINION
RESEARCH 117 (1943); Daniel, Statistically Sig-
nificant Differences in Observed Per Cents,
J. AP. PSYCHOL. 826-830 (1940).
22. Tables have been developed to save the
trouble of working out the mathematical for-
snula in each case, enabling one readily to
determine how many persons must be inter-
viewed to achieve a given percentage of accu-
racy. See Link, How Many Interviews Are
Necessary for Results of a Certain Accuracy?
21 J. APP. PsYcrL. 1-17 (1937); BSowN, UsE
OF STATISTICAL TucNNIQuS.q IN CERTAIN PROn-
LEraS oF MARKET RESEARCH (1935). These tables
indicate that in order to obtain an error of
2 per cent, 400 persons must be interviewed,
if the "Yes" and "No" answers are evenly
may also affect the nature of the an-
swer given, and this, together with the
wording of questions, must be careful-
ly considered to insure maximum ac-
curacy.
Cross-Section of Community:
Proper polling technique requires that
the community to be sampled must be
divided into economic, cultural and
social groups and that a selection of
representative interviewees or areas be
made.25 A large sampling may negate
the possibility of a sizable matheimati-
cal standard error, but without proper
sampling, accuracy may be seriously
endangered. The 1936 Literary Di-
gest poll is the classic example of poor
cross-section selection. Readers were
permitted to send in postcards with
their straw vote for President, and the
results were tabulated without any
cross-sectioning according to social and
economic class and geographical dis-
tribution.27 As a result, the almost
one million votes which were received
reflected the opinion of more well-to-
do econonuic classes and the poll failed
to reflect the opinions of a majority
of the American voters.
Statistical Techniques: Pollsters
have developed recognized and accept-
ed techniques for translating the an-
swers given by the interviewees into
meaningful mathematical percentages.
For a pollster to assume that because
seventy-five of 100 persons inter-
viewed answered "Yes" to a certain
question, that 75 per cent of the com-
munity would also have the same
opinion, is far too unsophisticated for
accurate polling. The answers of cer-
tain persons and certain areas and
groups may need to be given more or
less weight than those of others.
The weighting of poll results may
demand expertise beyond that pos-
sessed by the pollster. Large polling
divided, and 2,500 persons must be inter-
viewed to give a 1 per cent error.
23. See Roslow and Blankenship, Phrasing
the Question in Consumer Research, J. APP.
PSYCHOL. 612-622 (1939); PAYNE, TuE App oF
AsKiNG QUESTIONS (1951); Parry & Crossley,
Validity of Responses to Survey Questions, 14
PuB. Opie. Q. 61 (1950).
24. Cantril, Experiments in the Wording of
Questions, 4 PuB. OrIN. Q. 330 (1940).
25. Roper, Wording Questions for the Polls,
4 Pu . OpIs. Q. 129-130 (1940)
26. See McNemar, Sampling in Psychological
Research, 37 PSYCIHOL. BULL. 331-365 (1940).
27. See GALLUP and RAE, Tun PULSE OF DE-
MOCRACY (1940).
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organizations utilize the services of a
variety of persons-political scientists,
economists, sociologists, psychologists,
statisticians-to determine the proper
statistical weight to be given to par-
ticular areas and groups in each poll.
Random polls have been used and
have resulted in some degree of ac-
curacy, but the method of relying on
interviewing every one thousand per-
sons, for example, is too risky to be
given any strong weight as judicial
evidence.
Trained Interviewers: Finally, it
is important that the interviewers be
intelligent and trained in polling tech-
niques.28 The ability to establish a
proper atmosphere for questioning and
for obtaining honest answers, without
causing the interviewee embarrass-
Delaware
The undersigned hereby nominate
Alexander L. Nichols of Wilmington
for the office of State Delegate for and
from Delaware to be elected in 1964
for a three-year term beginning at the
adjournment of the 1964 Annual Meet-
ing:
William S. Megonigal, Jr., George
Tyler Coulson, David A. Drexler, Wal-
ter K. Stapleton, E. Norman Veasey,
John J. Morris, Jr., Albert W. James,
Alfred Fraczkowski, Arthur J. Sulli-
van, William F. Taylor, Jacob Kresh-
tool, Howard M. Handelman, Sotiere
S. Kapsalis, Garry G. Greenstein, Em-
mett J. Conte, Jr., John P. Daley,
Norman N. Aerenson, Joseph H. Flan-
zer, Thomas S. Lodge. Januar D. Bove,
Jr., Brereton Sturtevant, James M.
Mulligan, Jr., Arthur G. Connolly,
Robert W. Wakefield and Joseph P.
Hurley of Wilmington.
District of Columbia
The undersigned hereby nominate
David G. Bress of Washington to fill
the vacancy in the office of State Dele-
gate for and from the District of
Columbia:
ment or anger, is a prerequisite for a
good interviewer. The intelligence to
discern honest answers from joking or
sham replies and to make a judgment
as to the classification of the person
questioned so that the cross-section
schedule may be preserved is also es-
sential.
Competently Conducted
Polls Have Value
There is a definite trend toward the
use of opinion polls as judicial evi-
dence. Long an accepted evidentiary
source in appellate hearings, tile pub-
lic opinion poll has now come into its
own to provide proof of community
prejudice in hearings for continuance
and change of venue.
If the legal barriers against the ad-
William S. Thompson, Edward Ben-
nett Williams, William Roy Vallance,
Charles H. Burton, John D. Conner,
Richard K. Lyon, John W. Cragun,
Paul H. Gantt, Una Rita Quenstedt,
Milton I. Baldinger, 1H. Thomas Aus-
tern, Harold E. Mott, William E.
Stewart, Jr., Frederic Solomon, Sey-
mour M. Chase, Gerhard Van Arkel,
F. Elwood Davis, Fred Vinson, Earl
W. Kintner, F. Joseph Donohue, Alex-
ander M. Heron, James R. Stoner,
Brice W. Rhyne, Valentine B. Deale
and William Blum, Jr., of Washington.
Idaho
The undersigned hereby nominate
J. Blaine Anderson of Blackfoot for
the office of State Delegate for and
from Idaho to be elected in 1964 for
a three-year term beginning at the ad-
journment of the 1964 Annual Meet-
ing:
Thomas A. Miller, Paul B. Ennis,
Eugene C. Thomas and Don J. Me-
Clenahan of Boise;
Thomas H. Church of Burley;
Robert L. Alexanderson and Wayne
E. Davis of Caldwell;
J. Ray Cox and Thomas A. Mitchell
missibility of public opinion polls
have been overcome, still their ready
admissibility is not without dangers.
While the results of public opinion
polls often look deceptively simple,
their accuracy depends on the tech-
niques followed. Public opinion polls
represent a specialized area of social
science. Unless careful attention is
given to the size of the sample, the
wording of questions, the structure
of cross-section, the statistical tech-
niques, and the competency of inter-
viewers, their accuracy may be doubt-
ful. But administered carefully and
used intelligently, the public opinion
poll can bring a degree of certainty to
venue and continuance hearings which
is now lacking.
28. See GALLUP and RAE, Op. cit. SuPra note
27.
of Coeur d'Alene;
Orval Hansen, John M. Sharp, Eu-
gene L. Bush and Mary D. Adams of
Idaho Falls;
Marcus J. Ware and Wynne M.
Blake of Lewiston;
Grant L. Young of Rigby;
Sherman J. Bellwood and George
E. Redford of Rupert;
Keith Jergensen of St. Anthony;
Edward L. Benoit, Robert W. Ste-
phan, Robert N. W. Balleisen, James
M. Cunningham, Lloyd J. Walker and
Douglas D. Kramer of Twin Falls.
Indiana
The undersigned hereby nominate
C. Severin Buschmann, Jr., of Indian-
apolis for the office of State Delegate
for and from Indiana to be elected in
1964 for a three-year term beginning
at the adjournment of the 1964 Annual
Mceting:
Philip S. Cooper and George 0.
Chambers of Anderson;
Clarence J. Donovan and Robert W.
Short of Bedford;
Thomas H. Branaman of Browns-
town;
Paul D. Lawson and Arthur D. King
of Columbus;
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